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W. R. GRACE & CO. V. CAL. EMP. COM. [24 C.2d 
(Stats. 1939, ch. 1085) required that payments be made 
where the referee affirmed "an initial determination allow-
ing benefits." In 1937 it provided that if a referee affirms 
a decision of a deputy or the commission affirms a decision 
of the referee allowing benefits, the benefits must be paid 
regardless of the appeal. (Stats. 1937, p. 2059.) (See dis-
senting opinion in W. R. Grace & Co. v. California Emp. 
Com., this day filed post, p. 734 [151 P.2d 223].) 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[So F. No. 16839. In Bank. Aug. 18, 1944.] 
W. R. GRACE & COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Peti-
tioners, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMIS-
SION et aI., Respondents; FRANK ABELLEIRA et al., 
Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Mandamus-Defenses-Pendency of Another Action.-A writ 
of mandamus is not so exceptional in nature that it is never 
abated by the pendency of other litigation. Although it was 
originally a high prerogative writ to which the plea of another 
action pending was not available, it no longer depends on pre-
rogative power and is by statute expressly subject to the rules 
of practice applicable to other actions when there are no pro-
visions otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.) 
[2] Abatement - Pendency of Another Action - Mandamus Pro-
ceedings.-A writ of mandamus is denied if a similar applica-
tion between the same parties on the same matter is already 
pending before another court. The pendency of another action, 
[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 763, 849; 34 Am.Jur. 811; 35 Am.Jur. 70. 
[2] Action or suit as abating mandamus proceeding or vice 
versa, note, 37 A.L.R. 1432. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur. 28, 31; 1 Am.Jur. 
31,40. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 75; [2] Abatement and 
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however, is no defense unless it is "between the same parties 
for the same cause." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430(3).) 
[3] Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-
Superior court actions brought under Uriemployment Insur-
ance Act, § 45.10 (Stats. 1939, p. 2051; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1939 Supp., Act 8780d), do not abate a mandamus proceeding 
in the Supreme Court to test the validity of the Employment 
Commission's decision that claimants are entitled to benefits 
of the act, where the parties are not the same, some employers 
and claimants in the mandamus proceeding not being involved 
in the other actions. Moreover, the two causes of action are 
not the same, an action under § 45.10 simply determining the 
propriety of the employer's contribution to the fund, whereas 
the mandamus proceeding is in effect an appeal to the courts 
from a determination under § 67. 
[4] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Action to Recover Protested Pay-
ment.-No cause of action arises under Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, § 45.10 in relation to unemployment benefits unless 
they actually affect the amount of the employer's contribution 
and he pays the increased amount under protest. 
[5] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-The fact that plain-
tiffs in actions to recover unemployment contributions paid 
under protest may seek to support their claims with proof 
identical to that introduced in a separate mandamus proceed-
ing to test the validity of an award of unemployment benefits, 
is insufficient as a ground of abatement of the mandamus 
proceeding. 
[6] ld. - Remedies of Employer - Mandamus - Limitations.-A 
mandamus proceeding to compel the Employment Commission 
to vacate an award of unemployment benefits need not be 
commenced within the time preseribed for bringing an action 
under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 or § 41.1 to re-
cover contributions alleged to have been illegally assessed 
against an employer. The limitation periods prescribed in 
those statutes are not made applicable by Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1109, which specifies for mandamus proceedings only the 
. limitation periods prescribed in part two of that code. 
[7] ld. - Remedies of Employer -Mandamus - Limitations and 
Laches.-Where the Employment Commission's decision grant-
ing unemployment benefits was not released until more than 
13 months from the time it was dated, and where a request 
for a rehearing was denied. about two months later, it mandamus 
proceeding against the commission about 22 months after the 
date of said decision was within any applicable statute of 
limitations, and was not barred by laches. 
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[8] Sta.tutes - Construction - Presumptions - Intent to Change 
Law.-Although courts ordinarily infer an intent to change the 
law from a material change in the language of a statute, the 
circumstances may indicate merely a legislative intent to 
clarify the law. 
[9J Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Applicability to 
Waiting Period.-The disqualification imposed by Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act, § 56(a), if the claimant left.his work be-
cause of a trade dispute also applied to a waiting period with 
respect to unemployment even before the statute was amended 
to provide specifically that during the waiting period the 
claimant must be' eligible for benefits in virtually all respects 
(Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 13; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Bupp., 
Act 878Od, § 57(d) (3», and the fact that claims were being 
filed during such period warranted the inference that by so 
amending the statute the Legislature intended simply to clarify 
the law. 
[10] Id. - Disqualification - Applicability to Waiting Period.-
Since the lapse of a waiting period with respect to unemploy-
ment is simply a prerequisite to the pAyment of benefits and 
not an independent privilege conferred by the Unemployment 
Insurance Act, the conditions for eligibility for benefits logic-
ally apply to the waiting period. 
[l1J Id.-Initial Determination on Claim-Questions Involved.-
The question of eligibility for credit for the weeks of waiting 
period, as well as for the actual payment of benefits, is prop-
erly raised in proceedings under Unemployment Insurance 
Act, § 67, and the appeals allowed from the decisions therein, 
both under the former provision that the deputy shall deter-
mine whether or not the claim is valid and, if valid, the week 
with respect to which benefits shall commence, and under the 
present provision that the initial determination shall include 
a determination as to whether benefits are payable. 
[12J Id.-Disquali1ication-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
pute.-It is not the function of the Employment Commission 
to· evaluate the merits of a controversy between an employer 
and his employees; ·if a trade dispute exists and the employee 
leaves his work because of it, he may not receive benefits even 
though his employer is in the wrong. The disqualification im-
posed by Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a), is not con-
tingent on the merits of the controversy, and the commission 
exceeds its powers when it dete:r.mines the merits of an indus-
trial dispute and awards benefi.tsor credit for the weeks of 
waiting period on the basis of that determination. 
[13] Id.-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-The fact that the 
Employment Commission based its decision awarding benefits 
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on errQneous grounds does not of itself warrant the issuance 
of a writ of mandamus, if there was other legal justification 
for the decision. 
[14] Id.-Disquali1ication-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
pute.-Longshoremen who stopped working when they reached 
that stage in their work at which the dock checkers, who were 
· absent because of a strike, were usually employed, and long-
shoremen who were told by the employers not to commence 
work; unless they were willing to continue without checkers or 
ship clerks, were disqualified to receive benefits under Unem-
ployment Insurance Act, § 56(a), where the evidence indicated 
that the checkers were not essential to the performance of the 
longshore work, as the stoppage of work was equivalent to a 
leaving of work, whether the subsequent departure from the 
.employer's premises was on the longshoremen's own volition 
or at the employer's direction. 
[16] Id.-Disquali1ication-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
. pute.-Where the absence of dock checkers and ship clerks was 
. the controlling factor in the longshoremen's refusal to work 
because they regarded such absence as a breach of their col~ 
lective bargaining agreement with 'the employers, which the 
latter denied, such disagreement gave rise to a labor dispute. 
It was not essential to disqualification that a dispute should 
exist directly between the longshoremen and the employers i 
if the former left their work because of the dispute between 
the employers and the ship clerks, they in effect made the latter 
: dispute their own and were within the disqualification of Un-
· employment Insurance Act, § 56(a). 
[16J Id. - Disquali1l.cation - Temporary Disqua1i1ica.tion.-Unem-
ployment Insurance Act, § 58(a), imposing only a temporary 
disqualification on a claimant who leaves his most recent work 
voluntarily and without good cause, is not applicable to a 
claimant subject to the disqualification imposed by § 56(a). 
[17] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
pute.-Longshoremen who were told by their employers to re-
turn to a hiring hall either before or after the commencement 
of work did not leave their work within Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, § 56 (a), unless they were told to return: to the hiring 
hall because of their refusal to work without dock checkers, 
who were absent because of a strike. 
[18] Id . .,.-Disquali1ication-:-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
pute.-Longshoreme;n who were not dispatched from a hiring 
hall maintained by their union and the employers were not 
disqualified under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(s), un-
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ployer's request for longshoremen, because they would not 
work without dock checkers who were absent because of a 
strike. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California 
Employment Commission to vacate an award of unemploy-
ment benefits, and to correct its records by removing charges 
against petitioners' accounts. Writ granted. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison 
for Petitioners. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attor-
ney General, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Ralph 
R. Plante en, Maurice P. McCaffrey, Charles P. Scully, Forrest 
M. Hill, Glenn V. Walls, Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis & 
Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein, Gross-
man, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard Glad-
stein for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The claimants for unemployment insur-
ance benefits herein are longshoremen, members of Local 
1-10 of the International Lougshoremen's and Warehouse-
men's Union, District No.1, who work under a collective 
bargaining agreement with the Waterfront Employers' As-
sociation, an employers' association with a membership sub-
stantially the same as that of the former Dock-Checkers Em-
ployers' Association. (See Matson Terminals, Inc., v. Oali-
fornia Employment Oommission, ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 
691J.) According to the findings of the Employment Com-
mission the Ship Clerks' Union, a local belonging to the same 
international as the longshoremen's union, became involved in 
a dispute with one of the employers, the American-Hawaiian 
Steamship Company, and on June 14, 1939, called a strike 
against that company and established picket lines at its dock 
in San Francisco. Relations were suspended between mem-
bers of the union and members of the Dock-Checkers Employ-
ers' Association, and because of this suspension of relations, 
checkers and ship clerks failed to report for work on June 
17, 1939. The employers concede that because they regarded 
the strike against the American-Hawaiian Steamship Com-
pimy a violation of their agreement with the union, they re-
fused to employ any dock-checkers or ship clerks at the San 
Aug. 1944] W. R. GRACE & CO. V. CAL. EMP. COM. 
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Francisco Bay ports from June 17,1939, until the termination 
of the strike on June 27, 1939. 
On June 17th various gangs of longshoremen were dis-
patched by the hiring hall to docks operated by members of 
the employers' association. At the docks some of the long-
shoremen were told not to start work unless they would con-
tinue without checkers or ship clerks, while others were in-
structed by the employers or their agents to return to the 
hiring hall. Some gangs went to worl,t aboard the ships but 
stopped when they reached that stage of the work where 
checkers were usually employed. The men worked who were 
dispatched to docks where union clerks and checkers were 
not customarily required. Dock checkers and ship clerks keep 
clerical records of the cargo for the employer, but do no physi-
cal work in the loading and discharging of vessels. 
Approximately 5,000 longshoremen filed claims for unem-
ployment benefits for the period from June 17, 1939, to June 
27, 1939. The adjustment unit of the Division of Unemploy-
ment Insurance denied benefits on the ground that the claim-
ants were disqualified under section 56 (a) of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act. (Stats. 1935, ch. 352, as amended; 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d.) Payments, however, were 
erroneously made to a number of the claimants. Claiman:ts 
appealed from the adver8e ruling, and the referee after hear-
ing reversed the initial determinations and awarded benefits. 
Upon the employers' appeal, the commission, with one member 
dissenting, affirmed the referee's decision upon the ground 
that claimants were not disqualified under section 56 (a) of 
the act since the absence of checkers and ship clerks from 
docks where they were formerly customarily employed was a 
deviation from the customary method of working and therefore 
constituted a violation by the. employers of the requirement 
of the collective bargaining agreement that "present prac-
tices are to continue in effect." The commission held the 
claimants eligible to certify for the weeks of waiting period 
with respect to the unemployment involved, since they had 
not been previously unemployed long enough to render them 
eligible for benefits. 
Most of the employers thereafter filed actions in the supe-
rior court to recover unemployment insurance contributions 
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Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, for 
a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate its 
decision and to correct its records by removing therefrom any 
charges against the employers for payments to claimants for 
the period from June 17 to June 27,1939. The District Court 
of Appeal issued the writ and vacated the commission's deci-
sion. Thereafter, upon the petition of the commission and of 
claimants, who are interveners in the proceeding, this court 
granted a hearing. By stipulation the case was submitted on 
the record of the proceedings before the commission with the 
reservation of the right to try before the court the question 
whether the parties should have the right to try the case de 
novo but the question as to this right was not argued. 
The commission and claimants contend that the employers 
are not entitled to the writ, on the ground that they have not 
exhausted their administrative remedies and can secure ade-
quate relief under the provisions of section 41.1 of the Unem-
ployment Insurance Act. (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp., 
Act 8780d, § 41.1; Stats. 1941, ch. 940, p. 2535, § 2.) This 
contention is answered adversely in Matson Terminals, Inc., 
v. California Emp. Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202]. 
Their contention that the writ should be denied because the 
charges to the employers' accounts involved in this proceeding 
are also the subject of the actions pending in the superior 
court is likewise without merit. [1] The writ of mandamus 
is not so exceptional in nature, as petitioners suggest, that it 
is never abated by the pendency of other litigation. Although 
it was originally a hig"J. prerogative writ to which the plea of 
another action pending was not available (George v. Beaty, 
85 Cal.App. 525, 528 [260 P. 386] ; Calaveras County v. Brock-
way, 30 Cal. 325, 337; United States Protective Ass'n v. Board 
of Police Commrs., 14 Gal.App. 249 [111 P. 755] ; Gray v. Mul-
lins, 15 Cal.App. 118 [113 P. 694] ), it no longer depends upon 
prerogative power (Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye, 10 Cal.App. 534, 
537 [102 P. 677] ; Barnes v. Glide, 117 Cal. 1, 5-6 [48 P. 804, 59 
Am.St.Rep. 153] ; see 16 Cal.Jur. 763; Hart, An Introduction 
to Administrative Law, p. 439) and is by statute expressly 
subject to the rules of pl'actice applicable to other actions 
when there are no provisions otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc" 
§§ 1109, 1089; Taylor v. Burks, 6 Cal.App. 225, 228 [91 P. 
814] ; Jones v. Board of Police Commrs., 141 Cal. 96 [74 P. 
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696] ; Barnes v. Glide, supraj see Scott v. Superior Court, 83 
Cal.App. 25, 30 [256 P. 603] ; People v. Board of Supervisors, 
27 Cal. 655.) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 
thus made applicable to mandamus proceedings include those 
allowing the defense of "another action pending between the 
saine parties for the same cause." (Code Civ. Prov., §§ 430, 
433; Goytino v. McAleer, ,4 Cal.App. 655, 659-660 [88 P. 
991].) [2] The writ is therefore denied if a similar appli-
cation between the same parties on the same matter is already 
pending before another court. (Goytino v. McAleer, supraj 
McMullen v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 17 Cal.App.2d 696, 701-
702 [62 P.2d 1083].) The pendency of another action, how-
ever, is no defense unless it is "between the same parties for 
the same cause." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430 (3); Knapp v. 
Knapp, 15 Cal.2d 237, 243 [100 P.2d 759]; Schoonover v. 
Birnbaum, 150 Cal. 734, 736 [89 P. 1108] ; Capuccio v. Caire, 
189 Cal. 514, 528 [209 P. 367] ; McCormick v. Gross, 135 Cal. 
302 [67 P. 766] ; O'Hara v. Grand Lodge 1. O. G. T., 213 Cal. 
131, 144 [2 P.2d 21] ; see 1 Cal.Jur. 28-29, 31.) [3] The su-
perior court actions, which in the view of the commission and 
claimants abate the present proceedings, are suits to recover 
unemployment insurance contributions paid by the employers 
under protest, brought under authority of section 45.10 of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act. The parties are not the same, 
for some' employers who are petitioners herein, and claimants 
who are intervenors herein, are not involved. Moreover, 
those actions challenge the propriety of other contributions in 
addition to those affected by the commission's decision in the 
present case, and the two causes of action are not the same. 
The present petition for a writ of mandamus is to test the 
validity of the commission's decision that claimants are en-
titled to the benefits of the Unemployment Insurance Act in 
the form of payments or credit for the weeks of waiting pe-
riod, and is in effect an appeal to the courts from a determi-
nation under section 67 of the act. An action under section 
45.10 is entirely different, simply determining the propriety 
of the employer's contributions to the fund. (Bodinson Mfg. 
Co. v. California Employment Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 
935] ; Matson Terminals, Inc., v. California Employment Com-
mi:ssion, supra.) Section 67 allows any employer "whose re-
serve' account may be affected by the payment of benefits to 
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any individual formerly in his employ" to become an inter-
ested party to the proceeding to determine the validity of the 
claimant's application for benefits. [4] No cause of action 
arises under section 45.10 in relation to those benefits unless 
they actually affect the amount of the employer's contribution 
and he pays the increased amount under protest. The em-
ployer's protest of the amount of the contribution assessed 
against him may be based upon various grounds having no 
relation to the validity of benefits paid, and in the present 
case it is not clear from the complaints in the superior court 
action that the plaintiffs therein are attempting in that action 
to challenge the legality of the commission's decision involved 
in this proceeding. [5] The fact that they may upon a 
trial seek to support their claims with identical proof is in-
sufficient as a ground of abatement. (Hall v. Susskind, 109 
Cal. 203 [41 P. 1012].) 
[6] Claimants contend that the present proceeding is 
barred by the statute of limitations, and argue that it should 
have been commenced within the time prescribed for bringing 
an action under sections 45.10 or 41.1 to recover contributions 
alleged to have been illegally assessed against an employer. 
Actions brought under those sections, however, not only differ 
substantially from the proceedings for mandamus involved 
herein (Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. Oalifornia Employment Oom., 
supra; Matson Terminals, Inc., v; Oalifornia Employment 
Oom., supra) but the limitation periods prescribed in 
those statutes clearly were intended to apply only to actions 
brought thereunder. They are not made applicable by section 
1109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies for man-
damus proceedings only the limitation periods prescribed in 
part two of that code. (Code Civ Proc., § 1109; Jones v. Board 
of Police Oommrs., 141 Cal. 96 [74 P. 696] ; Dillon v. Board 
of Pension Oommrs., 18 Cal.2d 427 [116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 
800] .) No provision thereof that would bar the present pro-
ceeding has been cited. Section 343 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, referring to actions not otherwise provided for in 
the preceding sections of the code, provides simply that such 
actions must be commenced within four years after accrual of 
the cause of action. [7] In the present case the commis-
sion's decision, though dated April 3, 1940, was not released 
until May 21, 1941, and the petition for rehearing was not 
-'".~-,-.-~~---~-,.=~~--~~~---~---------------
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denied until July 19, 1941. The petition for the writ in the 
present action was filed in February, 1942. This period is 
well within any applicable statute of limitations, and no facts 
alleged indicate any laches on the part of petitioners. (See 
Scott v. Superior Oourt, 205 Cal. 525 [271 P. 906] ; Hayman 
v. Oity of Los Angeles, 17 Cal.App.2d 674, 680-681 [62 P.2d 
1047].) 
The commission and claimants contend that the commis-
sion's decision that claimants are eligible to certify for the 
weeks of waiting period with respect to the unemployment 
involved, instead of for benefits, prevents application of the 
disqualification of section 56 (a) since that section refers only 
to eligibility for benefits. They point out that after the period 
of unemployment here involved the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act was amended to provide specifically that during the 
waiting period the claimant must be eligible for benefits in 
virtually all respects (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 
8780d, § 57 (d) (3); Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 13), and contend 
that this amendment should not be applied retroactively. The 
fact that the statute was thus amended, however, does not 
necessarily indicate that the law was different before the 
amendment. [8) Although courts ordinarily infer an in-
tent to change the law from a material change in the language 
of a statute (People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116, 118 [255 P. 792, 
52 A.L.R. 811] ; Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 Ca1.2d 746 [82 P.2d 
1] ; see Crawford, Statutory Construction [1940], p. 618), the 
circumstances may indicate merely a legislative intent to 
clarify the law (Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Ca1.2d 275, 
278-279 [115 P.2d 425] ; Martin v. Oalifornia Mut. B. &; L. 
Ass'n, 18 Cal.2d 478, 484 [116 P.2d 71] ; San Joaquin Gin-
ning 00. v. McOolgan, 20 Ca1.2d 254, 263-264 [125 P.2d 36]) ; 
see 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, [3d ed., 1943] pp. 
415, 416, 418). [9] In the present case the fact that claims 
were being filed in situations such as the present one is enough 
to warrant the inference that the Legislature intended simply 
to clarify the law (see Union League Club v. Johnson, supraj 
San Joaquin Ginning 00. v. McOolgan, supra), since even 
before the amendment the eligibility requirements for the pay-
ment of benefits were properly applicable to the waiting pe-
riod. (Matter of Munterfering, 256 App.Div. 151 [9 N.Y.S. 
2d 830] ; see Martin v. Oalifornia Mut. B. &; L. Ass'n, supra.) 
;\ 
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The various disqualifications on eligibility for benefits im-
posed by the act then in effect clearly indicate that they weve 
intended to apply as well to the waiting period. For example, 
the act provided that a claimant was not eligible for benefits 
unless he was physically able to work and available for work 
whenever called on by his employer and had registered as un-
employed and for work (2 Deering's Gen. Laws 1937, Act 
8780 (d), § 51), and that he was not eligible for benefits for 
any week in which he had suitable employment (Ibid., § 52). 
The waiting period commenced from the date of his registra-
tion (Ibid., § 65), but if immediately thereafter he became 
physically unable to work or was unavailable for work or ob-
tained suitable employment, he would not be entitled to credit 
for the weeks of waiting period. [10] Since the lapse of the 
waiting period is simply a prereq~isite to the payment of 
benefits and not an independent privilege conferred by the 
act, the conditions for eligibility for benefits logically apply 
to the waiting period. (Matter of Munterfering, 256 App. 
Div. 151 [9 N.Y.S. 2d 830].) Thus, the disqualification im-
posed by section 56 if the claimant left his work because of a 
trade dispute also applied to the waiting period even before 
the statute specifically so provided. No question of retroac-
tive interpretation of the amendment is therefore involved. 
[11] The question of eligibility for credit for the weeks of 
waiting period as well as for the actual payment of benefits is 
properly raised in proceedings under section 67 of the act 
and the appeals allowed from the decisions therein, both under 
the former provision that the deputy shall determine whether 
or not the claim is valid and if valid the week with respect to 
which benefits shall commence (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, 
Act 8780d, § 67), and under the present provision that the 
initial determination shall include a determination as to 
whether benefits are payable. (Stats. 1939, ch. 1085, § 3; 
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939, Act 8780d, § 67.) 
Petitioners contend that claimants left their work because 
of a trade dispute and are therefore disqualified under section 
56 (a) of the act. (Stats. 1939, ch. 7, § 4; Deering's Gen. 
Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 56 (a).) It is their view that 
even though the checkers were locked out, their presence was 
not physically essential to performance of longshore work, 
and that the commission in determining whether claimants 
had left their work because of a trade dispute could not prop-
erly consider the question. whether the checkers' absence cre. 
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ated a condition of work in violation of the longshoremen's 
collective bargaining agreement. 
[12] It is not the function of the commission to evaluate 
the merits of a controversy between an employer and his em-
ployeeS!; if a trade dispute exists and the employee leaves his 
work bel'ause of it, he may not receive benefits even though his 
employer is in the wrong. In some states the unemployment 
insurance acts specifically provide that workers shall not be 
ineligible for benefits if the labor dispute is caused by the 
failure or refusal of the employer to conform to the provisions 
of any agreement or contract between the employer and em-
ployee (2 C.C.R. Unemployment Insurance Service 6214-6215, 
par. 4034 [Ariz.]; Ibid.; p. 7217, par. 4042 [Ark.]; 4 Ibid., 
p. 32,213, par. 4028 [N.R.]), but the disqualification imposed 
by section 56 (a) is not contingent upon the merits of the 
controversy nor was it intended that the commission should 
become an arbitrator of industrial disputes. The commission 
therefore exceeded its powers when'it determined the merits 
of the dispute in the present case and awarded benefits or 
credit for the weeks of waiting period on the basis of that 
determination. 
[13] The fact that the commission based its decision upon 
erroneous grounds, however, does not of itself warrant the 
issuance of the writ, if there was other legal justification for 
the decision. (Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 46-47 [17 Am.Rep. 
405]; Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 28-30 [251 P. 
784] .) In the present case the commission's findings of fact 
grouped claimants into three classifications: (1) those long-
shoremen who upon reporting at the docks were told by the 
employers or their agents not to begin work unless they were 
willing to continue without checkers; (2) those who stopped 
working when they reached that stage in their work where 
checkers are usually employed; and (3) those who were told 
by the employers to return to the hiring hall, either before or 
after they had begun work. 
[14] Those longshoremen who stopped working when they 
reached that stage in their work where checkers were usually 
employed and those who were told by the employers not t() 
commence work unless they were willing to continue without 
checkers or ship clerks are disqualified under the provisions 
of section 56 (a). (Matson Terminals, Inc., v. California 
Employment Commission, ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202]; 
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American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. v. California Employment 
Commission, ante, p. 716 [151 P.2d 213].) Although the 
commission states in its decision that it was customary for 
certain work to be done by checkers or clerks and that they 
were customarily employed at some of the docks, there was no 
finding that the longshoremen could not do their work without 
checkers, and the evidence before the commission indicated 
that they were not essential to the performance of the long-
shore work. The stoppage of wor~ therefore could not be at-
tributed to any physical inability to continue, and was equiva-
lent to a leaving of work, whether the subsequent departure 
from the employer's premises was on the longshoremen's 
own volition or at the employer's direction. [15] The com-
mission and claimants contend, however, that even if claimants 
left their work, they did not leave because of a trade dispute, 
but because of a condition of work resulting from a trade dis-
pute, namely, the absence of the checkers or ship clerks. There 
is little question, however, that the absence of the checkers 
and ship clerks gave rise to a trade dispute between the em-
ployers and the longshoremen independent of the dispute 
existing between the employers and the ship clerks, for the 
uncontradicted evidence shows that the longshoremen con-
tended that their collective bargaining agreement required 
the presence of the ship clerks, while the employers contended 
that the agreement was not violated by their absence and that 
even if it were, the longshoremen's remedy under that agree-
ment lay in arbitration. It may be that a clear violation by 
an employer of a definite and unambiguous term of his con-
tract would constitute the imposition of a more onerous condi-
tion of employment rather than a matter subject to a labor 
dispute. (See 3 C.C.R. Unemployment Insurance Service, 
par. 1f180.155, par. 1980.02.) If, however, the alleged viola-
tion is of a general provision, as in the present case, and is 
denied by the employer, the disagreement gives rise to a labor 
dispute. Although the commission made the general findings 
that" no dispute existed between last employer and claimants 
herein," this finding is nullified by other findings, supported 
by uncontradicted evidence, indicating that the absence of 
checkers and ship clerks was the controlling factor in the 
longshoremen's refusal to work because they regarded it as 
a breach of the collective barg-aining agreement. Since the 
finding that no dispute existed was coupled with the finding 
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that "none of the claimants herein are members of the Ship 
Clerks' Union," it was apparently intended to refer only to 
the original dispute between the ship clerks and the employers. 
Moreover, it was not essential to disqualification that a dis-
pute exist directly between the longshoremen and the em-
ployers; if the former left their work because of the dispute 
between the employers and the ship clerks, they in effect made 
the latter dispute their own and are within the disqualifica-
tion of section 56 (a). (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California 
Emp. Com., 17 Ca1.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935].) 
[16] The commission and claimants contend that in any 
event the award in the present case is justified by the provi-
tions of section 58 (a) of the act imposing only a temporary 
disqualification upon a claimant who leaves his most recent 
work voluntarily and without good cause. They contend that 
if the claimants be held to have left their work voluntarily, 
they should be subject to no more severe penalty than that 
imposed by section 58 (a) since no formal strike was called by 
the longshoremen's union and no picket line was established 
by them, and since those who refused to work did so because 
of changed conditions of employment. The disqualification 
imposed by that section, however, is not applicable to a claim-
ant subject to the disqualification imposed by section 56 (a). 
(See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra.) 
[17] Those claimants, however, in the third classification 
described above, who were told by their employers to return to 
the hiring hall either before or after the commencement of 
work, did not leave their work within the meaning of section 
56 (a) unless they were told to return to the hirmg hall be-
cause of their refusal to work without checkers. The com-
mission's finding is uncertain in this regard. [18] It ap-
pears from the record of the proceedings before the commis-
sion that some of the claimants were never dispatched from 
the hiring hall, although there is evidence that during the 
period of the dispute between June 17th and June 27th orders 
for longshoremen were placed by the employers with the dis-
patcher at the hiring hall that were not filed. These claim-
ant£ are not disqualrfied under section 56 (a) unless they 
refused to be dispatched, in response to the employers' re-
quest for longshoremen because they would not work without 
checkers. There should be a finding by the commission in 
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identify the claimants that were within the various classifica-
tions discussed earlier. The commission should therefore be 
required to take whatever additional evidence is necessary 
and to make determinations as to the individual claimants in 
accord with the views herein expressed. (See Bila v. Young, 
20 CaI.2d 865, 870 [129 P.2d 364] ; Helvering v. Rankin, 295 
U.S. 123, 131 [55 S.Ot. 732, 79 L.Ed. 1343] ; Federal Com-
munioations Com. v. Pottsville Broadoasting 00.,309 U.S. 134, 
145 [60 S.Ot. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656] ; Helvering v. Smith, 132 F. 
2d 965, 968.) 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue ordering the com-
mission to proceed as herein directed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent upon the same grounds as set forth 
in my dissenting opinion in Matson Terminals, 1'11,0., v. Oali-
fornia Emp. Com;, this day filed, ante, p. 711 [151 P.2d 
211]. 
In this case, however, the initial determination by the ad-
justment unit was against the employees. On appeal the 
referee allowed benefits, and the allowance was affirmed by 
the commission. The unemployment occurred in June, 1939. 
At that time section 67 of the California Unemployment In-
surance Act as amended in 1937 was in effect, and it provided 
that benefits were payable regardless of any appeal where 
there had been either an allowance of benefits by the adjust-
ment unit followed by an affirmance by the referee or an al-
lowance by a referee followed by an affirmance by the com-
mission (Stats. 1937, p. 2059). Although the proceedings to 
determine the claim for benefits occurred after the 1939 
amendment went into effect, there is nothing in that amend-
ment to indicate that it is retroactive. The right to benefits 
regardless of appeal is a substantive right which should not 
be defeated by a subsequent change in the law at least unless 
such an intent clearly appears. 
In my opinion the writ should be denied. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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BUNNY'S WAFFLE SHOP, INC. (a Corporation) et aI., 
Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COM-
MISSION et aI., Respondents; MITCHELL VEZILICH 
et aI., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Unemployment Relief - Disquali1l.cation - Leaving Work Be-
cause of Trade Dispute. - Unemployment Insurance Act, 
§ 56(a) (Stats.1935, p.1226, as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1937, Act 878Od), does not disqualify an employee from re-
ceiving benefits in all cases where his unemployment results 
directly or indirectly from a labor dispute, but makes him 
ineligible only if he left his work because of the dispute. There 
must therefore be a direct causal connection between the trade 
dispute and the leaving of work. 
[2a, 2b] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade 
Dispute.-Restaurant employees were not disqualified by Un-
employment Insurance Act, § 56(a), from receiving benefits 
because they left work in the course of a trade dispute, where 
a reduction of wages and changes to more onerous conditions 
of work, which were not subjects of the dispute, were imposed 
by the employers for the sole purpose of coercing the em-
employees' unions into bargaining collectively with the employ-
ers' representative, and were to continue only until the unions 
agreed to do so. The employees left their work because of 
this economic weapon, and not because of the trade dispute 
then in existence. . 
[3] Labor - Economic Pressure Activities. - A strike sanction 
merely indicates approval by a central agency of a possible 
strike, and is primarily a threat of economic action. 
[4] Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Leaving Work Be-
cause of Trade Dispute.-A strike against a single member of 
an employers' collective bargaining unit involves economic 
action against that employer only, and subjects to disqualifi-
cation under the Unemployment Insurance Act those employees 
only who leave their work because of the dispute. If the other 
employers thereupon choose to close their establishments and 
[1] See 11 Oal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "Unemploy-
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
:M:cK. Dig. References: [1,2,4, 6J Unemployment Relief; [3,5] 
Labor, § 20a. 
